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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff & Respondent 
vs. 
SID K. SPENCER, 





The appellant, Sid K. Spencer, was convicted of 
the crime of PERJURY in the first degree. The com-
plaint charging the offense was filed on May 31, 1939, 
and omitting the heading and title, reads as follows: 
''On this 31st day of May, A. D., 1939, be-
fore me, A. H. Ellett, City Judge and Ex-Officio 
Justice of the Peace of the City Court within 
and for Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, personally appeared Arthur B. Bring-
hurst, who, on being sworn by me, on his oath, 
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did say that Sid K. Spencer on the 31st day of 
May, A. D., 1939, at the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, did commit the crime of PERJURY, 
as follows, to-wit: 
''That the said Sid K. Spencer, at the time 
and place aforesaid, committed perjury by testi-
fying as follows : 
" 'I have not driven a car at any time since 
my license was revoked for drunken driving.' 
"contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the 
State aforesaid, in such ·cases made and pro-
vided, and against the peace and dignity of the 
State of Utah. 
ARTHUR B. BRINGHURST. 
ATTEST: 
ETHEL MACDONALD 
CLERK OF CITY COURT 
BY J. BRYANT MORETON, 
Deputy. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, the day 
and year first above written. 
A. H. ELLETT, 
City Judge and Ex-Officio 
Justice of the Peace." (Tr. 5). 
The proceeding wherein the perjury was allegedly 
committed was one in which appallant was charged 
with driving an automobile without a driver's license 
on the 21st day of April, 1939. 
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Upon his trial in the court of Justice of Peace 
Arthur B. Bringhurst, on l\Iay 31, 1939, appellant was 
sworn on his oath and took the witness stand in his 
own behalf. He denied that he droYe an automobile on 
the 21st day of April, 1939. The State's evidence in 
the instant case was that, while upon the witness stand 
in the case in Judge Bringhurst's court and upon cross 
examination, appellant was asked the question as to 
wheth.er or not he had driven an automobile since his 
driver's license was revoked for drunken driving, to 
which appellant replied: 
''I have not driven my car at any time since 
my license was revoked for drunken driving.'' 
(Tr. 68, 96 and 97.) 
It was admitted that on the 14th day of June, 
1938, defendant's license was revoked for a period of 
one year for drunken driving. ( Tr. 60.) 
The charging portion of the information filed by 
the district attorney for the Third Judicial District 
alleges: 
"That the said Sid K. Spencer, on the 31st 
day of May, A. D., 1939, at the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, committed perjury by testi-
fying as follows : 
'' 'I have not driven a car at any time since 
my license was revoked for drunken driving.' '' 
(Tr. 6.) 
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Subsequently, upon demand by counsel for appel-
lant, a bill of particulars was filed by the district at-
torney, which, omitting the heading, title, and signatures, 
reads as follows: 
''Comes now the State of Utah and pursuant 
to Section 105-21-9, Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 
1935, and hereby makes the following Bill of 
Particulars, to-wit: 
''That on the 23d day of April, 1939, the 
Defendant herein was charged with the crime 
of violating Section 29, Chapter 45, Laws of 
Utah, 1933, in that he had on the 21st day of 
April, 1939, in Salt Lake County, driven and 
operated a motor vehicle, to-wit, an automobile 
upon a highway within the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, towit, in the 3500 Block on High-
land Drive, and that at said time that said De-
fendant did not have a driver's license, the same 
having been revoked on the 14th day of June, 
1938. Said charge was made against the De-
fendant by a complaint sworn to by E. L. Jen-
sen and filed before Arthur B. Bringhurst, the 
duly elected, qualified and acting Justice of the 
Peace within and for the Third Precinct, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
''That thereafter the said Defendant pleaded 
NOT GUILTY to said charge, and on the 31st 
day of May, 1939, said case was being tried be-
fore the said Justice of the Peace, and the De-
fendant was s''rorn on his oath, and on said day 
was called as a witness in said case, and at said 
>') 
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time and _place testified, while so under oath, 
as follmYs: 
"'I haYe not driven a car at any time since 
my license was revoked for drunken driving.' 
"'and said testimony was material to the issues 
of said case and said testimony was then and 
there untrue and not the fact; and the driver's 
license of the said Defendant had been revoked 
·on the 14th day of June, A. D., 1938." (Tr. 15 & 
16.) 
Upon the ple-adings above mentioned, the case was 
tried to a jury and the defendant was found guilty of 
perjury in the first degree. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON 
The appeal \Vas taken before the new rules of thi~ 
court were put into effect on March 1, 1941, and numer-
ous assignments of error were filed. The arguments 
in appellant's brief are, however, limited to two, i.e. 
(1) That the complaint and information, as amplified 
by the bill of particulars, does not state facts sufficient 
to constitute a public offense; and (2) That the evidence 
does not support the conviction. 
In the final paragraph of his brief, counsel for ap-
pellant states that there are other assignments of 
error, and the same are not waived. The errors as-
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signed but not argued are, however, by the rules of 
this court deemed to be waived. Accordingly, we shall 
proceed upon the assumption that the alleged errors 
above mentioned are the only ones before this court 
for consideration. 
PARTICULAR QUESTIONS INVOLVED: 
1. Whether the complaint and information, as am-
plified by the bill of particulars, state facts sufficient 
to constitute a public offense; and 
2. Whether the evidence supports the conviction. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION, AS AM-
PLIFIED BY THE BILL OF PARTICULARS, 
STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTI-
TUTE A PUBLIC OFFENSE 
The statute under which the defendant was con-
victed, Section 3 of Chapter 134, Laws of Utah, 1937, 
reads as follows: 
''A person is guilty of perjury in the first 
degree who commits perjury as to any material 
matter in or in connection with any action or 
special proceeding, civil or criminal, or any hear-
ing or inquiry involving the ends of public justicP 
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or on an orcasion in which an oath or affirmation 
is required or n1ay lawfully be administered." 
One of the matters relied upon by appellant in 
support of his contention that a public offense is not 
charged is that the statement allegedly n1ade by ap-
pellant in Judge Bringhurst's court and upon which 
the perjury charge is predicated was not material to 
any matter then before the court. We believe that this 
contention is unsound. 
In People YS. Greenwall, 5 Utah 112, 13 Pac. 89, it 
is stated: 
"Evidence is deemed material to the issue, 
and perjury may be assigned upon it, if it tends 
to establish a material circumstance or link in the 
chain of evidence or is circumstantially material, 
or tends in any way to characterize the rna tter at 
issue, * * *." 
In 48 C. J., Section 34, "Perjury," it is stated: 
"The degree of materiality is unimportant. 
False testimony directly pertinent to the main 
issue is, of course, material. But, it is not neces-
sary that the false statement should bear directly 
upon the main issue. It is sufficient if the state-
ment is collaterally, remotely, corroborately, or 
circumstantially material, or has a legitimat(:> 
tendency to prove or disprove any material fact 
in the chain of evidence, even though not in itself 
sufficient to establish the issue. * * *" (Citing 
numerous cases including People vs. Greenwall, 
supra.) 
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The charge upon which the appellant was being :,i: 
tried before Judge Bringhurst was that he drove an 
automobile on April 21, 1939, without a driver's li- A A 
cense. It was admitted that his driver's license had 1'·1 
been revoked prior to that date, and that it had not 0t ~( 
been restored at the time of his trial in Judge Bring-
hurst's court. (Tr. 60). Any statement made by ap-
pellant which bore upon the question as to whether 
or not he drove a car on April 21, 1939, would obviously 
be material and relevant within the rules above men-
tioned, and would, in fact, go to the very nub of the 
offense with which he was charged. Any statement 
made by appellant to the effect that he had not driven 
an automobile since his driver's license was revoked 
would, in effect, be an assertion that he had not driven 
his car on April 21, 1939, and since he had no license 
on that date, it was tantamount to his saying that he 
had not driven his car on that date without a driver's 
license. This, of course, was the very gravamen of 
the charge in the trial at which appellant was testify-
ing. It appears, therefore, too clear to admit of argu-
ment that the statement attributable to appellant was 
material and relevant to the proceeding in the trial at 
which such statement was made, and that such state-
ment, if false, was therefor such that a charge of perj-
ury could properly be predicated upon it. 
Counsel for appellant emphasizes the fact that 
} ] 
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neither the complaint nor the information contains any 
allegation as to what the question was to which the 
defendant made the aswer which is the basis of the 
Perjury charge. It is our belief and contention that no 
such allegation was necessary. If the answer given by 
appellant was material to the issues of the case before 
the court, and such answer was untrue, the giving of 
such an answer would constitute perjury regardless of 
what question was propounded to which the answer was 
a response. 
In Volume III, Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edi-
tion, Section 785, we find the following statement: 
''Where the witness, either in a deposition or 
on the stand, goes beyond the scope of the ques-
tion, and makes an aswer not responsive, there 
is here nothing 'per se' wrong. If the answer in-
cludes irrelevant facts, they may he struck out, 
and the jury directed to ignore them; if it fur-
nishes relevant facts, then they are none the less 
admissible merely because they were not speci-
fically asked for: * * * 
"The only ground of complaint for non-respon-
sive answers is that, in the case of a deposition 
(for the reason above noted), such an answer 
may entitle the opponent to additional cross-ex-
amination on the new matter,-a rule dealt with 
elsewhere. Courts ought to cease repeating the 
novel and unwholesome assertion that 'where an 
answer is not responsive to the question put, it 
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is the duty of the Court to strike it out, on mo. 
tion.' 
''This topic of responsiveness has somehow 
become in modern times beset with crude mis-
understandings, that tend to suppress truth and 
turn the inquiry into a logomachy: 
'' ( 1) Sometimes it is said that the party 
questioning may object on this ground, but not 
the opposing party. But there should be no such 
distinction ; if the answer gives an admissible 
fact, it is receivable, whether the question cov- ~~\ 
ered it or not. No party is owner of facts in 
his private right. No party can impose silence 
on the witness called by Justice.'' 
In Holzer vs. Reed, et al. (Cal. 1932), 13 Pac. (2d), 
697, it is stated: 
''If the answer is in i tsel£ proper evidence, 
the party who is examining the witness has the 
right to take and retain it, if he chooses to do 
so.'' 
In Cassidy vs. Hilman, (Ky.) 31 S. W. 726, wherein 
appellant's own witness had given testimony damag-
ing to appellant's case, the court stated: 
"It is said by appellant that his own wit-
ness, in response to a question propounded to 
him, disclosed the fact of the alteration; that this 
disclosure was not responsive to the question 
asked the witness, and, therefore, should have been 
excluded. \V e think not. The facts developed 
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show the alteration, and while it comes from 
appellant's own witness, and not in response to 
the question propounded, still the testimony was 
competent. * * *" 
Other cases holding that the mere fact that testi-
mony is not responsive to questions asked a witness 
does not make such testimony inadmissible are, Mas-
succo vs. Tomassi, (Vt.) 67 Atl. 551; Murphy vs. Cop-
tieters, (Cal.), 68 Pac. 970; Mobile Light & R. Com-
pany vs. Davis, (Ala.), 55 So. 1020; and Streeter vs. 
Sawyer, 28 N.H. 555. 
Even though the answer g1ven by appellant were 
not responsive to a particular question asked, or even 
though it were volunteered without any interrogatory, 
if relevant and material to the issue then before the 
court, it was admissible and binding upon the appellant 
and, if untrue, would constitute a proper basis for a 
charge of perjury. Hence, it is our contention and 
belief that there was no necessity for alleging what 
question was propounded and the failure to make such 
an allegation in no way affected the validity of the com-
plaint or information, particularly since both the com-
plaint and the information follow strictly the form pre-
scribed by Section 105-11-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, as amended by Chapter 143, Laws of Utah, 1937, 
and Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935, as hereinafter 
indicated and set forth. 
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Counsel for appellant contends that the bill of par-
ticulars was not complete and responsive to the demand 
therefor, in that it failed to furnish certain informa-
tion called for by the demand. Attention is directed to 
the fact that at the trial of the case, while a discussion 
of the bill of particulars was being carried on between 
the court and .counsel for the respective parties, the 
district attorney offered to furnish further information 
to supplement the bill of particulars, (Tr. 137.) Ap-
pellant's counsel at the trial, however, declined any 
such offer with the statement: 
"We are perfe:ctly satisfied with the bill of 
particulars because it is definite and certain ; 
***" 
"This is as definite and certain as it can 
be, and we have relied upon it. " ( Tr. 138.) 
Appellant is, of course, bound by such statements 
of his counsel. If he was not satisfied with bill of 
particulars as rendered, the time to have made objec-
tion thereto was before or at the trial so that the court 
could have ordered a supplemental or new bill of par-
ticulars as contemplated by Section 105-21-9 of Chapter 
118, Laws of Utah, 1935. Having failed to make any 
such objection, but on the contrary having indicated hi~ 
satisfaction with the bill of particulars, it is too late 
now for appellant to first raise the objection that the 
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bill of particulars was not complete and responsive to 
the demand. 
The information was in the exact form prescribed 
by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935, and particularly 
Section 105-21-47, as set forth in that Chapter, which 
designates, among other things, the form of informa-
tion to be used for charging the crime of perjury. Sec-
tion 105-11-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amend-
ed by Chapter 143, Laws of Utah, 1937, provides that: 
'' * * * in cases of public offenses triable 
upon information, indictment or accusation, the 
complaint, the right to a bill of particulars, and 
all proceedings and matters in relation thereto, 
shall conform to and be governed by the provi-
sions of the new Chapters 21 and 23 of Title 105, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as enacted by 
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935." 
This being the case, and it being apparent as here-
inbefore set forth that the answer of appellant was 
material to the proceedings before the court at the time 
the answer was given, and that an allegation in the 
complaint or information as to the question propounded 
was unnecessary, the only theory left upon which it 
might be contended that the complaint and information, 
coupled with the bill of particulars, do not state a public 
offense is that the statutes enacted by Chapter 118, 
Laws of Utah, 1935, and Chapter 143, Laws of Utah, 
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1937, are unconstitutionaL ThLs question has not, how-
ever, been raised or argued in appellant's brief. Hence, 
the matter has been waived and is not now before this 
court. 
ARGUMENT IT 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO .SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTION 
For the State, Justice of the Peace Arthur B. 
Bringhurst testified that at the trial in his court on 
May 31, 1939, when appellant was being tried for driv-
ing an automobile without a driver's license, appellant 
was asked the question as to whether or not he had 
driven an automobile since his driver's license was re-
voked for drunken driving, to which he gaye the re-
sponse indicated in the information, (Tr. 68.) Deputy 
County Attorney J. Patton Neeley, who represented 
the State in the trial in Judge Bringhurst's court, testi-
fied to substantially the same facts as did Judge Bring-
hurst, (Tr. 96 and 97.) Robert Barnes, an employee 
of the l\!fotor Vehicle Department of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, testified that appellant's driver's license 
was revoked on June 14, 1938, for a period of one year, 
and such facts were admitted by appellant's counsel. 
(Tr. 60.) State Highway Patrolman Elden L. Jensen, 
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testified that on the 21st day of April, 1939, the ap-
pellant was driving an automobile in the vicinity of 
~Iaple Avenue and Highland Drive in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and that on that date, he, Jensen, saw 
appellant driving an automobile and that he followed 
the automobile driven by appellant for a short distance 
on Maple Avenue, at which time appellant got out of 
the automobile. Appellant was then arrested by Jen-
sen. (Tr. 112 and 113.) There is nothing in the record 
which would discredit the testimony of any of these wit-
nesses. Insofar as the record shows, all are reliable 
persons of good reputation and there is nothing which 
would cast any suspicion upon their reputations for 
truth and veracity or their credibility as witnesses. It 
is, of course, well settled that the credibility of wit-
nesses and the weight and value to be given their testi-
mony are questions exclusively for the jury. State vs. 
Diaz, 76 Utah 463, 290 Pac. 727; State vs. Gleason, 86 
Utah 26, 40 Pac. (2d), 222; State vs. Roberts, 91 Utah 
177, 63 Pac. (2d), 584. 
The jury apparently chose to believe the testimony 
of the State's witnesses and gave such testimony suffi-
cient weight as to conclude that appellant was guilty 
of the crime charged. The evidence, if believed, was 
surely sufficient to warrant such a conclusion on the 
part of the jury, and hence the verdict should not be 
disturbed by this court. 
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In appellant's brief, the observation is made that 
the record does not indicate what ultimate disposition 
was made of the case of the State of Utah against Sid 
Spencer on the charge of driving an automobile with-
out a driver's license. It is our belief that this has no 
bearing upon the validity of the conviction in the case 
now before this court, and in support of such assertion, 
attention is directed to 48 C. J., Section 36, "Perjury," 
wherein it is stated: 
"The actual effect of a false statement has 
no bearing on its materiality, and the guilt of one 
who has falsely sworn does not depend upon the 
result of the proceedings in which it occurred." 
(Citing cases.) 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant was fairly tried under a complaint 
and information meeting in every way the requirements 
as set forth by our statutes. It is our belief as herein-
before indicated that all of the proceedings were regu-
lar, that the complaint, information, and bill of par-
ticulars properly charged the offense of perjury, and 
that the evidence presented at the trial was sufficient 
and ample to convict the defendant. It is accordingly 
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urged that the verdict of the jury and the sentence of 
the court below should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General. 
ZAR E. HAYES, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Respondent, 
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